Ambassador (ret.) Philip Wilcox: The US must present its own Middle East peace plan

Ambassador Wilcox termed Barack Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo as "stunning", and he praised the President for showing an equal measure of compassion for Israelis and Palestinians, without diminishing America's "unbreakable" bond with Israel.

Nonetheless, the Ambassador remarked, speeches would not be enough: The US would have to submit its own peace plan, so that the ‘end game' could be more sharply defined. The US will need to create more specific policies on issues such as borders, Jerusalem, settlements and refugees and will then have to convince the Israeli and Palestinian majorities to accept them.

The old step-by-step diplomatic approach was no longer applicable, Ambassador Wilcox reasoned, since the two-state solution was in mortal danger, and both the Israeli and Palestinian political systems were hamstrung and unable to move forward without significant American involvement.

American Presidents past

Looking back over the last 3 decades, Ambassador Wilcox noted that American administrations had a "checkered" record regarding the Israeli-Arab peace process.

President Carter, he began, had been "unfairly vilified", and should be given due credit for the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Carter also introduced new American language regarding the settlements, referring to them as "illegal" and a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

President Reagan, the Ambassador noted, had abandoned this terminology, paving the way for a more lenient American policy toward the settlements.

During the 1989-1992 period, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker recognized that the end of the Cold War marked an opportunity for Mideast peacemaking. However, their initiative in this area languished due to the constraints of electoral politics

The Clinton/Oslo period (1993-2000) also ended in failure because the US took too small a role in the process, the Ambassador explained. The US allowed Israelis and Palestinians to determine the pace of talks, guided by the argument that "Washington can't want peace more than the parties themselves". The US also tended to defer to Israeli demands during the Clinton presidency, Ambassador Wilcox related.

According to the Ambassador, the major flaw of the Clinton/Oslo approach was its mistaken belief that confidence-building measures (CBMs) alone could lead to a final-status agreement without a predetermined vision of what peace would look like. The inability of the parties to commit to an end result (e.g. two states, 1967 borders) enabled the doubling of the settler population and created a political incentive for renewed terrorism by Palestinian rejectionists.

The policy of George W. Bush's administration was marked by a mistaken decision to see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the ‘global war on terrorism'. In doing so, Bush and his advisers failed to grasp the national nature of the struggle. Bush also expanded on Clinton's policy of deferring to the wishes of the Israeli Prime Minister (Sharon, and then Olmert).

The special relationship and the role of AIPAC

Ambassador Wilcox emphasized in this context that he did not endorse the notion that an all-powerful "Jewish lobby" controlled US foreign policy. AIPAC, he said, did have influence, but it was certainly no match for a President who wished to lead. AIPAC was also not the reason that the US had historically catered to Israel's preferences. This, he said, could be explained by other factors, including common cultural, historic and religious bonds; the moral debt to the Jewish people due to its two thousand years of suffering; and Israel's role as ally in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the US-Israel alliance was not of itself a bad thing: It had persuaded the Arab world that Israel was here to stay, for example. But the alliance had never been fully utilized to steer the Israeli government away from policies that were bad for Israel and the US, and toward policies that might eventually bring peace.

The hope of Obama

The Presidency of Barak Obama, Ambassador Wilcox remarked, offers great hope for the peace process. The speedy appointment of George Mitchell as Obama's special envoy was an encouraging sign. Mitchell, he reported, would never have accepted this post if he were not confident that Obama is serious about Mideast peace. Secretary of State Clinton, too, seems to be in tune with President Obama's approach, and the two are displaying a strong partnership. Rahm Emanuel was "on board" as well.

Asked how President Obama might actualize his peace initiative if Israel's right-wing government resists, Ambassador Wilcox replied that the President should and will focus on honest candor and persuasion. Threats and sanctions had no place as an initial diplomatic gambit, he argued, notwithstanding calls by some to use US aid to Israel as a lever.

Nonetheless, the Ambassador did not rule out the use of ‘sticks' in addition to ‘carrots' at a later point down the road. Such sticks could include:

* Revoking the tax-exempt status of US charities that provide funds to settlements;
* Withholding economic aid in amounts equivalent to Israeli government expenditure on settlements;
* Resurrecting the definition of all West Bank settlements as illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention;
* A more "objective" US handling of UN resolutions.

But should the parties embrace the peace option, the US was well placed to help, Ambassador Wilcox maintained. The US could lead up an international compensation fund for relocating Israeli settlers and for compensating Palestinian refugees (since there would be no right of return in practice). The US could also be involved in deploying international forces in the West Bank.

Ambassador Wilcox stressed that the American people would back the President if they were convinced that his policy was fair to both sides and necessary for US national security. The President would also reach out to liberal progressives in the American Jewish community to gain their support. In this context, groups like Meretz USA were critical to the peace process, the Ambassador observed. Congress, too, would follow the President's lead, he said, noting the growing importance of "peace lobbies", such as J Street and Churches for Middle East Peace.

As for Israel and Palestine

Looking at the Israeli scene, Ambassador Wilcox stressed the importance of creating a "new Zionism", one that would be centered around peace and justice and that would marginalize those who worshipped land above all else. He also noted that Israelis had clearly been traumatized by Palestinian violence between 2000-03, and that a new security concept was therefore necessary to persuade the IDF and the Israeli public that Israel could be safer without the settlements and the territories.

Commenting on the Palestinian scene, the Ambassador defined Hamas as a "huge problem", but argued that the US and Israel had been foolish in their reaction to Hamas' electoral victory in 2006: A refusal to recognize the Hamas government and actively discouraging the creation of a Fatah-Hamas unity government.

Part of the US' problem, he observed, is that Hamas was essentially uncharted territory for American diplomats, since no talks are held with the organization. The Ambassador noted that Hamas is not monolithic, and that it was important to explore whether there were pragmatists in the organization willing to make a deal.

In the meantime, Ambassador Wilcox maintained, the physical and humanitarian crisis in Gaza had to be addressed, since the situation there was creating a breeding ground for radicalism and violence.